

5 DEC 1973

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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In Communist Propaganda


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5 DECEMBER 1973

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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

BREZHNEV URGES STABLE PEACE; ISRAEL BLAMED FOR HALT OF TALKS

Moscow has continued its approving publicity for the 26-28 November Arab summit conference in Algiers, with Soviet media pointing up the Arab leaders' statement on support from the USSR and other socialist countries. Comment on Egypt's 29 November decision to halt the Egyptian-Israeli talks at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road holds Israeli tactics of "sabotage and procrastination" responsible for Cairo's move. But only once did Moscow suggest that suspension of these talks might affect the forthcoming peace conference, when TASS on the 2d cited the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY as claiming that Israel was preventing the creation of conditions for convocation of the conference. Brezhnev in his 29 November speech to the Indian parliament briefly mentioned the need to achieve a peace settlement "in the coming talks," but in line with routine Moscow comment, he did not mention any Soviet role as a sponsor of the conference. Consistent with this reticence, TASS in reporting President as-Sadat's 28 November press conference ignored his remarks on Soviet and U.S. participation in the peace conference.

TASS on 4 December reported the State Department announcement that Secretary Kissinger would begin a tour of Middle East countries on 13 December, visiting Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. The TASS report on as-Sadat's remarks had quoted him as saying that a new Kissinger visit was a possibility. And in noting as-Sadat's statement that Israel was procrastinating in implementing the Egyptian-Israeli 11 November agreement, TASS explained that this "protocol" was "signed as a result of Kissinger's previous visit" to the Middle East. Moscow heretofore had gone out of its way to avoid linking the agreement with Secretary Kissinger's Middle East talks.

BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev's restrained remarks in his New Delhi speech on the 29th stressed the need for a stable peace to prevent a still more dangerous military explosion "at any time." He made the usual stereotyped call for elimination of the "consequences of Israeli aggression" and referred to Israel's "aggressive policy" but otherwise refrained from criticism of Israel. He underlined the importance of Soviet-U.S. detente in preventing an even more dangerous clash

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in the Middle East and in making possible the big-power initiative for a cease-fire. Assessing the changes in the Arab world in the past six years--since the 1967 war--Brezhnev cited the Arabs' increased strength and their effective solidarity in the military sphere and in political and economic steps, as well as the end to the "myth of invincibility" of Israel's armed forces. Brezhnev as usual predicated a peace settlement on the satisfactory solution of two issues, Israeli withdrawal and the Palestinians. With respect to the latter, he issued a lukewarm call to "safeguard justice vis-a-vis the Arab people of Palestine," rather than the usual demand for insuring the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians, or, as in the recent Soviet-Yugoslav communique on the Brezhnev-Tito talks, Palestinian "national" rights.

Brezhnev added that peaceful coexistence and "goodneighborliness" between the Arab states and Israel should be founded on the basis of such a settlement. Kosygin was apparently the first of the Soviet leaders to advocate "good-neighborly" relations between the Arabs and Israel when he referred in a February 1971 speech to a desire for peace under conditions in which all the peoples of the Middle East could live as good neighbors. Since then Soviet commentators from time to time have said that peace should be insured through the establishment of such relations.

KILOMETER 101 TALKS Soviet media, reporting Cairo's decision to break off the Kilometer 101 talks, have been at pains to stress Israeli responsibility for this action through its failure to fulfill the second point of the 11 November Egyptian-Israeli agreement--the question of return to the 22 October positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces. Soviet comment has avoided any discussion of the flurry of diplomatic contacts to resolve the problem and continued to dwell on the need for Israel to comply with the agreements it has signed and withdraw its troops to the 22 October positions. Moscow has repeated the Egyptian Government spokesman's statement holding Israel responsible for the consequences resulting from nonfulfillment of Security Council resolutions.

The Egyptian action and ensuing military tension has not prompted any noticeable increase of comment from Moscow, which has noted that Israel put its troops on full alert and has remarked on "alarming reports" of Tel Aviv's "latest military preparations." TASS has continued its practice of periodic dispatches from New York citing UNEF and UN observer reports of Israel's cease-fire violations. A 3 December report claimed that Israel continued

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to whip up tension and "intensified its armed provocations" in all sectors. A report on 30 November acknowledged Israel's "impudent 'complaints' over alleged violations by Egypt" and declared that not one of a dozen such complaints lodged on 27 November had been confirmed by UN patrols. Moscow in a 3 December Arabic-language broadcast provided the first report on the stationing of Soviet observers on the cease-fire line. The radio's Cairo correspondent interviewed the leader of the 12-man group of observers "who were sent to Egypt at the request of the Egyptian Government" in accordance with a UN decision. Describing the group's duties, the Soviet colonel said an Israeli violation of Egyptian airspace had already been reported to the UNEF command.

A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 30th and PRAVDA on the 1st commented that Egypt fulfilled its obligations under the 11 November agreement, but that Israel, through "sabotage and procrastination," was trying to use the talks to camouflage continuing military preparations. The PRAVDA article, by Cairo correspondent Glukhov, accused Israel of trying to turn the Kilometer 101 talks into an arena for political maneuvers while attempting to circumvent Resolution 339 demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 22 October positions. PRAVDA's international review on 2 December said UN observers thought new fighting might break out and declared that "naturally this cannot be accepted." The Arabs and their friends, PRAVDA said, demanded that Israel stop its dangerous maneuvers, sit at the negotiating table, and agree to withdraw its forces from occupied Arab territory.

TASS on the 3d cited the Egyptian spokesman as saying that Egypt would agree to resumption of the Kilometer 101 talks only if Israel displayed a genuine desire to fulfill all points of the UN resolution on a cease-fire. While TASS noted that UNEF Commander Siilasvuo had met with the Egyptian war minister, it did not mention Siilasvuo's similar contacts in Jerusalem. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 1st did make one of the infrequent mentions of Soviet diplomatic activity in citing the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY for a report that President as-Sadat had received Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov, but without indicating the subject of the meeting. Cairo radio's press review on the 2d said the Egyptian press highlighted urgent diplomatic contacts among Cairo, Moscow and Washington in an effort to prevent a new explosion in the area "as a result of Israel's refusal to implement the Security Council decisions on withdrawal."

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ARAB SUMMIT Moscow's considerable attention to the Arab summit conference in Algiers has largely consisted of replays of the five conference statements--a political statement and four separate documents addressed to the African countries, the nonaligned states, West Europe, and the socialist countries. Comment has predictably played up the latter statement, with PRAVDA on the 30th, for example, remarking that the Arab leaders noted "with pride and satisfaction" the full political support and military and economic aid rendered by the USSR and other socialist states to the Arabs in their just struggle to liberate their territories and restore Palestinian rights. A foreign-language commentary by Rassadin on the 29th said the most important result was the fact that the participants took "concrete decisions" on problems discussed; implementation of these decisions, he said, would contribute in a practical manner to the strengthening of Arab solidarity.

Moscow reportage has singled out, among other points, the political statement's declaration that the cease-fire is not peace, which requires several conditions including two "basic" ones--Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and restoration of the Palestinian people's "national rights." Moscow comment did not mention the summit decision recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. This omission may be due at least in part to the fact that the decision, while reported in Arab media, was apparently not incorporated in any of the formal conference documents.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

SOVIET LEADERS DISCOUNT IMPACT OF MIDDLE EAST WAR ON DETENTE

Soviet leaders who have spoken since the outbreak of the Middle East conflict have sought to play down its impact on the regime's detente policies. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kirilenko, Suslov and Shcherbitskiy have reaffirmed the goals of the landmark April plenum and have asserted that the "main trend" of international affairs is toward detente. Brezhnev and Kosygin have gone on to minimize difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations and reaffirm the high marks given the Administration for its approach to bilateral relations. The remarks of the two leaders have implied, however, that the U.S. military alert and its public rationale were an unfortunate deviation from the general course of improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.

In a speech to the Indian Parliament on 29 November, Brezhnev again took the offensive on detente in a manner reminiscent of his expansive discussion of East-West relations during his U.S. visit in June. He depicted broad international cooperation as "the only alternative to nuclear disaster" and emphasized the urgency of peace as a prerequisite for Soviet economic progress. Kosygin in Minsk on 14 November, as reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA of the 15th, had expressed optimism that "the international situation is taking shape in a way which is favorable to our country" and that "the noble aims which the party sets itself in the sphere of foreign policy will be achieved."

Brezhnev's New Delhi speech was his first major statement on foreign affairs since President Nixon's 26 October news conference in which he discussed the U.S. alert. In the speech Brezhnev echoed earlier remarks by Kosygin in Minsk in denying that the U.S. actions had altered Moscow's attitude toward relations with the United States. Like Kosygin, Brezhnev emphasized the role of detente in ameliorating the Middle East crisis: "If the current conflict had flared up in a situation of universal international tension and aggravation of relations, say between the United States and the Soviet Union, the clash in the Middle East might have become much more dangerous, and it might have assumed a scope threatening world peace." Kosygin had also sought to lay to rest suggestions that Moscow has begun to question U.S. intentions to honor commitments made at the Moscow and Washington summits. He emphasized that the "Soviet Government"

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believes the United States, like the Soviet Union, is "doing everything incumbent on it" to carry out joint agreements. A more conditional assessment of U.S. intentions had seemed implicit in the immediate aftermath of the Middle East crisis, in Kirilenko's cool assessment of bilateral relations in his October Revolution anniversary speech and in a Matveyev commentary on trade in the 3 November IZVESTIYA.*

That Brezhnev continues to value improved U.S.-Soviet relations as a key to the success of the regime's overall foreign policy goals was evident in the joint declaration released at the close of his India visit. The declaration highlighted the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and the prevention of nuclear war agreement in particular. But it was also in Brezhnev's New Delhi speech that the effects of the Middle East events were most apparent. While disclaiming that detente, "like all significant changes in history," would be a "simple matter" to achieve, he displayed greater awareness of the pitfalls in the U.S.-Soviet relationship by publicly acknowledging the presence of "zigzags and hitches" in the process of improving relations. Greater appreciation for the potential obstacles to U.S.-Soviet rapprochement was also evident in Brezhnev's statement that "the positive processes taking place in international relations in our time are becoming, perhaps, most strikingly expressed on the European continent." Similar statements have appeared in Soviet commentary since the U.S. alert.

* These developments are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, pages 9-10.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW HITS PARIS AND BONN ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE PROPOSALS

Soviet comment on West European developments relating to the Middle East crisis and the U.S. military alert has undergone a shift of tone and emphasis since mid-November. Whereas at first Moscow played up the rift between the United States and its European allies as a manifestation of alleged U.S. highhandedness vis-a-vis Europe and its NATO allies, it is now showing concern lest the effects of the crisis force West Europeans into developing an independent West European defense system, either within the NATO framework or parallel to it. In this connection, Moscow has criticized both Bonn and Paris for their open calls for developing greater European unity in the security sphere.

THE BONN CABINET
MEETING

Moscow's criticism of Paris and Bonn seemed to be prompted by two particular events, the Bonn cabinet meeting on 15 November and French Foreign Minister Jobert's speech on the 21st to the West European Union. As reported by DER SPIEGEL on the 19th, the Bonn cabinet session, some 12 hours long, discussed the "ultimate consequence" of the current Bonn-Washington rift: the possible acceleration of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the FRG. According to the West German weekly, the cabinet concluded that while there is no substitute for the U.S. nuclear umbrella at the present time, the political union of West Europe should be accelerated with the hope that in the future a European nuclear force could "mitigate the dependence" of Europe on the United States.

PRAVDA's Bonn correspondent Ye. Grigoryev on the 21st lashed out at what he described as an FRG plan to propose "the creation of a Europe defense council." Referring to Western press reports, Grigoryev said that "it is a question not of an all-European organ but of a separate body including representatives of the Nine which many observers regard as the possible forerunner of some new military bloc in West Europe." Grigoryev acknowledged that difficulties have arisen within the EC and NATO which presented the West Europeans with "considerable political and economic problems requiring a solution," but he condemned the purported FRG proposal as being "at variance with the tasks of safeguarding peace and security on our continent." He asserted that only efforts of an all-European nature can insure a durable security for Europe.

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JOBERT'S WEU SPEECH Similarly, Moscow in both press and radio comment has taken Paris to task, again without mentioning the individual targets of its criticism. In an obvious allusion to speeches by Jobert to the National Assembly on the 12th and at the WEU on the 21st, Moscow strongly rebuked those who asserted that West Europe needs to oppose an alleged "condominium" of the two "superpowers." An article by Victor Tsoppi in LITERARY GAZETTE on the 28th charged that such assertions "are directly aimed at undermining" the principles of trust, mutual understanding, and mutual cooperation between East and West Europe. It noted tersely that the recent WEU meeting had discussed the issue of the "acceleration of the military-political integration of West Europe" and had heard complaints that this development was being slowed down by the development of equal relations with the socialist states. It concluded that those who "are now agonizingly disguising their own dark ulterior motives by attacking the policy of detente" will not succeed in altering the Soviet policy of "strengthening security and cooperation in Europe."

A Moscow radio commentary on 2 December, citing a letter sent by French CP head Marchais to President Pompidou strongly attacking Paris' foreign policy, asserted that West European "politicians" are returning to "the old plan of a European defense community which had been rejected in 1954 by the French parliament and to efforts to revive the idea of European nuclear forces." The commentary labeled these intentions, long condemned in routine Soviet comment on European security, as an attempt to push Europe back into the period of the cold war.

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U S S R - I N D I A

MOSCOW ACCLAIMS RESULTS OF BREZHNEV VISIT TO DELHI

Moscow's public display of satisfaction with the 26-30 November visit of Soviet party chief Brezhnev to India was capped by a joint statement issued 3 December by the CPSU Politburo, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Council of Ministers which gave "full" approval to the results of his activities in India. During the trip Brezhnev held lengthy talks with Mrs. Gandhi and made several speeches, including a major address before the Indian parliament on 29 November. The two countries concluded a comprehensive 15-year economic agreement, an agreement on cooperation between the Soviet and Indian economic planning bodies, and a consular convention; and Brezhnev and Mrs. Gandhi signed a joint declaration issued on the 30th.

The Soviet leader was accompanied on the trip by Politburo member and Foreign Minister Gromyko, Politburo member and Kazakhstan party chief Kunayev, State Planning Committee Chairman Baybakov, and Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for External Economic Relations Skachkov. This was Brezhnev's first visit to India since 1961 and his first trip to a third world country since becoming CPSU general secretary in 1964. Since Mrs. Gandhi's state visit to the USSR in September 1971, no major Soviet leader has made an official visit to India, although President Podgornyy stopped off briefly in India in October 1971 en route to North Vietnam and was honored at a banquet given by Mrs. Gandhi.

The joint declaration on the visit indicated that the exchange of views on "crucial questions of the international situation" had revealed a "coincidence or proximity of positions." It and the joint statement marking Gandhi's 1971 visit were very similar in their expressions of support for such Soviet-inspired proposals as the necessity to convene a European security conference and a world disarmament conference, and both supported peaceful solutions to problems in Asia. In the current declaration, Mrs. Gandhi praised Brezhnev's efforts to achieve international detente. Significantly, however, India has not been inclined to include in either document an endorsement of Moscow's Asian collective security proposal, a nebulous scheme that has been advocated by Brezhnev since 1969. In the current declaration Moscow has moved only slightly closer to India's position on the need to establish an Indian Ocean peace zone.

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The conclusion of the first long-term comprehensive economic agreement during the Brezhnev visit has apparently received criticism in India and Mrs. Gandhi felt constrained to assert shortly after the Soviet leader's departure that the agreement did not constitute an infringement on India's independence as alleged.*

INDIAN OCEAN
PEACE ZONE

As a growing, major naval power, the USSR is obviously wary of any attempts to limit its activities on the seas, and has been circumspect toward the Indian Ocean peace proposal advocated by several countries in the region, including India. The formulation employed in the joint declaration on this visit appears to link Moscow closer to the Indian position now than it was in September 1971, when the joint statement expressed the views of each side separately.

The present declaration states: "The two parties reaffirmed their readiness to take part, together with all interested states on an equal basis, in the search for a favorable solution" to the question. By contrast, the 29 September 1971 formulation was: "The prime minister of India reaffirmed that the Indian Ocean area should be made a zone of peace. The Soviet side expressed its readiness to study this question and to solve it together with other powers on an equal basis."

The depth of India's concern was revealed the day Brezhnev left Delhi, when India's minister of state for external affairs declared that India did not want "any fleet" to operate in the Indian Ocean. A connection between the Indian Ocean peace zone and the Asian collective security proposals was established in an article review broadcast by Delhi radio in late August: the article asserted that a collective security system was "inextricably linked with a trouble-free Indian Ocean" and that under circumstances of "big power rivalry," India was against involvement in any security pact or system.

* On 25 November a correspondent of the government-run Delhi radio contended that Western press reports speculating that Brezhnev's visit would result in defense and security arrangements had "absolutely no basis" and represented an attempt to create misunderstanding among India's neighbors.

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ASIAN COLLECTIVE
SECURITY

The Brezhnev visit speeches and the joint declaration offer no evidence that he was able to budge India from its unwillingness to endorse his pet Asian collective security project. In his speech to parliament the Soviet leader took an additional step to support this proposal by calling for "active, broad, and constructive" discussions on the concept, a possible allusion to the convening of an international conference. His proposal for talks was meant to press the Indians to exhibit at least reserved support for the vaguely defined proposal.* The sensitivity of both Moscow and India on this subject was revealed in the assertions by spokesmen from both sides during the visit that Asian collective security was not discussed during at least four of the five meetings between Mrs. Gandhi and Brezhnev, even though the situation in Asia was said to have been the main topic during one of these discussions.

Moscow's lavish propaganda output preceding Brezhnev's visit reflected hopes that India might support the Soviet proposal for Asian collective security. Recent commentaries had suggested that the principles inherent in the 1971 Soviet-Indian treaty could serve as a basis for efforts to achieve collective security, but they did not attempt to identify such principles specifically. Moscow evidently based its hopes on a 1972-73 annual report of the Indian foreign ministry that had stressed "the constructive nature" of the proposal. Moscow also publicized numerous statements by Indian personalities expressing support for the Soviet proposal.

THE SPECTER
OF CHINA

The topic of China was conspicuously absent from both Soviet and Indian public statements during the visit, and an Indian spokesman made a "categorical" assertion that China was not discussed at any of the talks held by Mrs. Gandhi and Brezhnev. However, the

* It may not have been entirely coincidental that on the same day Asia's only communist and noncommunist governments to voice support for the scheme, Mongolia and Iran, issued a joint statement announcing their resolve "to help fulfill the idea of creating a collective security system in Asia that will include all the nations on this continent." The statement was issued at the conclusion of Mongolian leader Tsedenbal's 24-29 November visit to Iran. This is the third time Iran has expressed official support for the Soviet initiative since March 1973. The only other Asian country to hint at interest has been Afghanistan, but its implied endorsement in March 1972 was stated more ambiguously in May 1973, shortly before the government was overthrown; the new government has not yet expressed its views on this publicly.

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joint declaration's contention that "there are no grounds whatever" for delaying the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations was obviously directed at China, which has been instrumental in blocking efforts to seat the new nation.

In an effort to depict itself as a firm supporter of India, Moscow's propaganda recently began supporting India's claims in the still unresolved territorial dispute with China.* This move may have been designed to complicate India's announced efforts to improve relations with Peking and at the same time improve Soviet chances of eventual support from India for the Asian collective security proposal, which is directed against China.

* For a discussion of this change in Moscow's attitude, see the TRENDS of 17 January 1973, pages 12-14.

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INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG SOFTPEDAL COMMUNIST ATTACKS, SCORE ALLIED ACTIONS

There was no immediate communist comment on current escalated attacks in South Vietnam--the rocketing of the Nha Be fuel depot near Saigon on the morning of 3 December and the communist assaults on the following day on the district capital of Kien Duc and other positions in Quang Duc Province.

Initial communist news reports on the 4th cited Western sources crediting the PLAF with the destruction of the fuel depot, but Hanoi and Liberation Radio pickups of foreign reports on the 5th described the impact of the fuel loss without ever mentioning the communist attack. By contrast, the communists' capture of Saigon positions in Quang Duc on 4 November and shelling of Bien Hoa airfield two days later had prompted laudatory comment within a day.

Communist reticence on the current action may reflect concern over the possibility of allied retaliation for the attacks. Anxiety over allied intentions was authoritatively voiced in a 5 December DRV Foreign Ministry statement which denounced allied charges that the DRV was preparing for an offensive and recent warnings of possible U.S. action. It claimed that such "slandorous and threatening allegations" are aimed at hiding allied violations and preparing for "new military adventures."

This statement echoed earlier communist comment denouncing Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 30 November press conference remarks on the possibility of U.S. intervention in the event of a large-scale North Vietnamese offensive. The Secretary's comments also prompted protests by the DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen on the 1st and 3d, respectively. Foreign ministry statements by the PRG on 29 November and the DRV on the 30th had focused on alleged continuing U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam, reiterating previous charges that more than 24,000 U.S. military personnel remain in the South and that Washington is instigating Saigon military activities.

Alleged U.S. reconnaissance flights over North and South Vietnam and Saigon air strikes in the South continued to draw the usual protests by Hanoi and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen. The statements accuse the United States of carrying out reconnaissance over many DRV provinces on 3 December and over coastal areas on

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the 1st, and they score similar activities over PRG-controlled areas in Quang Tri Province by SR-71 planes on the 28th and unmanned planes on the 29th. The spokesmen's protests on Saigon's bombing were prompted by air strikes in the Loc Ninh area on 30 November and 3 December.

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CHINA

PROVINCES ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE "RED AND EXPERT" BALANCE

A complaint that further efforts must be made to safeguard the educational reforms of the cultural revolution, voiced by a young woman graduate of the Shanghai Teacher's College returning to Heilungkiang, has been picked up by the Shanghai newspapers on 21 November and the Heilungkiang radio on the 24th.

The young graduate noted that the "mental shackles of giving first place to education have not been completely smashed," and she pointed out examples of university favoritism to those who were proficient only in professional knowledge. She acknowledged that professional knowledge is necessary, stating that her criticism "does not mean that we do not need knowledge," but her description of the university suggests that overemphasis on professional knowledge has virtually wiped out the political restraints imposed during the cultural revolution. According to her, not only the life at the university but also future job assignments--including selection of the university staff--was controlled by the staff leadership, with favored assignees taken from those who "excelled in professional knowledge, obeyed the teachers, and seldom posted big-character posters."

The campaign to reform policies in institutions of higher education seems openly modeled on the successful attempt this past summer to prevent localities from selecting college entrants solely on the basis of academic achievement, and may be backed by the same forces as the previous campaign. The summer campaign focused on a young student from Liaoning, also in northeast China, who became a national hero and model for the "going against the tide" slogan adopted at the party congress in August.

A Shanghai comment on the young graduate's complaint, in the form of a Shanghai WEN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editor's note, has not been monitored from the Shanghai radio itself, although the Harbin radio broadcast the note text and said it has been published in the HEILUNGKIANG DAILY. The note quoted Chou En-lai's party congress instruction on the continuing importance of struggle in the cultural sphere and treated the complaints of the Heilungkiang student as an example of the continuing struggle over ideological line. The editor's note, like the student herself, did not advocate disregard for professional learning

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but stressed the need to be "both red and expert." An editor's note by HEILUNGKIANG DAILY called on those working "on the culture and education front" to write in with their comments on the student's talk, indicating that further comment would be forthcoming.

While Shanghai has been active in calling for "redness" in education, it has not advocated abolishing professional standards. A Shanghai broadcast on 21 November, the same day the Shanghai newspapers ran their comments on the talk by the returning Heilungkiang student, stated that a conference on worker-teachers in primary and middle schools had decided to call on departments concerned "to raise their level of professional knowledge." And a Shanghai broadcast on 17 November lauded the party committee of Fudan University for organizing formal lectures on recent Western developments in modern physics.

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U S S R

LVOV OBLAST LEADER REMOVED AFTER LOCAL DEMONSTRATIONS

The demotion of Lvov party obkom First Secretary V.S. Kutsevol to the position of chairman of the Ukrainian People's Control Committee, an appointment reported by Lvov radio on 27 November, marks a major setback in the career of the 53-year-old Lvov leader. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Kutsevol was sympathetic to nationalist deviations, he appears to be a casualty of the campaign against nationalism waged by Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy and his ideological whip Malanchuk. In particular, his demotion appears to be closely related to the anti-Russian demonstrations in Lvov last spring which led to intervention by both Moscow and Kiev. It is noteworthy in this connection that Kutsevol's successor, V.F. Dobrik, former first secretary in Brezhnev's home town of Dneprodzerzhinsk, earlier had also been sent to the West Ukraine as a troubleshooter against nationalist unrest.

UNREST IN LVOV Ironically, Kutsevol and Malanchuk have had close career ties in postwar Lvov, where both men became obkom section heads by 1961. Shortly after Kutsevol's elevation to obkom first secretary in December 1962, Malanchuk became obkom secretary for ideology and remained in this post until 1967. During this period a number of Ukrainian dissidents were arrested and tried in Lvov.

However, beginning in 1971 the Lvov party organization came under criticism for its handling of nationalism. Malanchuk, then Ukrainian deputy minister of higher education, attacked a group of Lvov historians for nationalist deviations in a 29 June 1971 PRAVDA UKRAINY article, and he authored a lengthy pro-Russian version of Ukrainian history in the Lvov literary journal ZHOVTEN in early 1972. The attack was accompanied by a KGB crackdown in Lvov involving the January 1972 arrest of tourist Jaroslav Dobosh and subsequent arrests of several Lvov dissidents, who were tried in 1972 and in 1973. In March 1973 another tourist, Mykola Horbach, was arrested in Lvov, and various dissidents were publicly accused of improper ties with him.

In early 1973 students at Lvov State University demonstrated against the crackdown. Reports reaching Ukrainian emigre papers in August indicated that 13 philology students had been arrested

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for protesting a ban on commemorating Ukrainian poet Shevchenko's birthday and for distributing a nationalist publication. In May nine students were reportedly arrested for protesting Russification, disseminating leaflets, and arguing for freer access to historical source material, and seven teachers--including a department head and several senior professors--were fired for associating with dissidents. According to the emigre reports, Malanchuk personally supervised the Lvov crackdown and ordered the students tried, but was overruled by a commission from Moscow.

Apparently in response to the Lvov university disorders, the Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow convened in mid-June a Lvov conference on methods of intensifying indoctrination. As reported in the 24 June RADYANSKA UKRAINA, Kutsevol addressed the conference, along with Ukrainian Agitprop chief I. Z. Orel, in the latter's last reported public speech before his ouster. Writing about the conference in a July issue of the Ukrainian Central Committee's propaganda journal POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA, Lvov obkom agitprop head V. Mikhaylov stressed the need to "strengthen the consciousness of belonging to one socialist motherland" and to publicize the contributions to Lvov by other regions of the Soviet Union. Mikhaylov, a Russian, had succeeded a Ukrainian in this post during the past year.

A weakening in Kutsevol's position was also indicated by the disclosure in PRAVDA on 24 March of widespread illegal dacha building in Lvov. On 10 August Kutsevol reported in PRAVDA that the Lvov city executive committee chairman had been censured and some officials fired in connection with these abuses.

Kutsevol's successor, Dobrik, rose to first secretary of Dneprodzerzhinsk during Shcherbitskiy's tenure as Dnepropetrovsk oblast first secretary in the early 1960's. As boss of Brezhnev's home town, Dobrik has been especially favored by Brezhnev, whom he has warmly praised. He was the only Ukrainian gorkom secretary elected to the CPSU Central Committee at the 1966 CPSU Congress, and he was the only speaker at the 1971 Ukrainian party congress to show unusual deference to Brezhnev, thanking him "personally" for aid to the Ukraine.* In March 1969 he was sent to the West Ukraine to become first secretary of Ivano-Frankovsk oblast, which was experiencing serious problems with Ukrainian nationalism.**

* See the TRENDS of 31 March 1971, page 34.

** See the SURVEY of 27 March 1969, pages 21-22.

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NOTE

DPRK CLAIMS: As negotiations between North and South Korea began on 5 December to discuss possible reorganization of the North-South Coordination Committee, the DPRK seemed to be trying to strengthen its hand by laying claim to control over access to five islands long under the jurisdiction of the UN Command and by accusing the United States of violating the North's airspace. Efforts to reinvigorate the stalemated talks got underway with the NSCC meeting between the deputy chairmen of the two sides; so far efforts to renew the lower-level Red Cross talks have been fruitless.

A basis for the North's claim to the islands has existed ever since the DPRK recognized 12-mile territorial limit; the islands are only a short distance off North Korea's southwest coast. DPRK officials, in a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on 1 December, asserted for the first time that visits to the islands must receive prior approval from the North, since the islands are in DPRK territorial waters. Initial Pyongyang media treatment of the issue has been subdued, with no authoritative statements or newspaper editorials to date.

Pyongyang media on 5 December charged that an SR-71 reconnaissance plane had violated North Korean airspace on two occasions on the 4th, but there has been no official protest over what the reports described as a "grave military provocation." The last previous such protest, on 9 March 1972, was treated in a similarly low-keyed fashion.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 26 NOVEMBER - 2 DECEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2554 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1196 items)</u>		
Brezhnev in India	(15%)	39%	Domestic Issues	(33%)	40%
[Speech to Indian Parliament	(--)	3%]	Middle East	(2%)	14%
[Joint Declaration	(---)	4%]	[Arab Summit	(--)	6%]
Middle East	(7%)	7%	Conference, Algiers		
[Arab Summit	(--)	4%]	Albanian National Day	(--)	12%
Conference, Algiers			Indochina	(31%)	5%
Yugoslav National Day	(--)	6%	[PRG Leader Nguyen Huu Tho in PRC	(25%)	1%]
China	(7%)	2%	Korea UN Debate	(8%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.